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Abstract. In humid regions of the eastern United States, 	The chief drawbacks of transfers are that local streamflow 
rainfalls and streamflows have usually been sufficient to standards could be violated and third parties could be 
supply nearly all human needs. In those states a set of 	impaired. 
common-law precedents known as the riparian doctrine has Other agency decisions include the duration of permits 
evolved. This doctrine is rather imprecise compared to the 	and their averaging periods. 
appropriative doctrine of the western states. In recent years, 
problems of concentrated use have become more common and 
severe in humid regions, leading to calls for water 	 INTRODUCTION 
regulations. There are a number of options for such 
regulations; this paper provides a comparison of alternatives 	In the humid regions of the eastern United States, 
in the context of six program objectives and a number of rainfalls and streamflows have usually been sufficient to 
agency decisions. 	 supply nearly all human needs. In those states a set of 
The first program objective is the ease of setting up the 	common-law precedents known as the riparian doctrine has 
program initially (implementation), operating it routinely evolved to govern water use. This doctrine is rather 
(administration), and insuring compliance with it 	imprecise compared to the appropriative doctrine of the 
(enforcement). The second is maintaining equity, or the western states and many riparian states lack a strong, 
perception thereof, among water users. The third is to 	comprehensive, set of water use regulations. In recent years, 
maintain minimum streamflows. The fourth is robustness, or however, problems of concentrated use have become more 
insensitivity to errors in the data. The fifth is economic 	common and severe in humid regions. Aquifer levels and 
efficiency. The final objective is political and legal aquatic stream habitats have been threatened by concentrated 
feasibility. 	 withdrawals as cities have expanded, and highly consumptive 
The first agency decision is what the permit should entitle 	irrigation has increased in use. While discussion of 
its holder to do and under what circumstances. An comprehensive management programs has occurred (e.g., 
operational definition of a permit must say where, and for 	Mack and Peralta, 1987), implementation has not been 
how long, the water may be withdrawn and what happens widespread. 
when there is not enough water to supply all users. Options 	It is assumed here that a water management agency or 
for permit structure are: 1) no regulations, 2) prioritized ministry (referred to as the agency) has been charged with 
permits like those used in the West, and 3) fractional permits, 	developing and administering a water withdrawal permit 
in which users' allowable withdrawals increase and decrease program. Each user receives a permit allowing a rate of 
with streamflow. Only the latter, fractional permits, are seen 	withdrawal that depends, generally, on ambient (streamflow) 
as appropriate for traditionally riparian regions. 	 conditions. A set of target minimum streamflows for 
Another agency decision is on what basis permits should 	protection of the aquatic ecosystem is assumed already set. 
be distributed initially. Size allocations could be roughly The difference between this minimum and the streamflow at 
proportional to some measure of past use rate or current size 	any point is the total allowable withdrawal, or TAW. 
of operation (e.g., hectares irrigated or population served) The agency is assumed to have the legal authority to 
with provisions to dissuade profligate use just to receive a 	regulate withdrawals and is assumed to be searching for the 
higher allocation. 	 most effective way to craft a permit system to control 
Another decision is whether or not permits should be 	withdrawals by offstream users. In doing so, it has a myriad 
transferable and, if so, under what circumstances or of decisions to make and, in making those decisions, is 
restrictions, etc. The most frequently-cited argument in favor 	attempting to balance six objectives. The objectives and 
of allowing users to transfer permits is economic efficiency. decisions are discussed below. 
AGENCY OBJECTIVES 
The agency is assumed to pursue six objectives. The first 
is to maximize the ease on its part in setting up the program 
initially (implementation), operating it routinely 
(administration), and insuring compliance with it 
(enforcement). This is an important feature of, and indeed the 
essential purpose of, the permits program. Ideally, the 
program should insure the smooth functioning of the 
distribution of water, including disputes among users, without 
resort to the courts. 
The second objective is maintaining equity among water 
users. Equity is very much in the eye of the beholder, and the 
decision about what is equitable or inequitable is arbitrary to 
some extent. However, some program features are more 
universally accepted as equitable than others. An example is 
the principle of allocating permit sizes in rough proportion to 
the user's size. While there may be argument on which 
measure of size should be used, there will be greater 
agreement that allocation in proportion to some measure of 
size is more equitable than equal size allocation to all users, 
great and small. 
The third objective is that for the program is originally 
devised, viz., to maintain streamflows. If minimum stream-
flow requirements vary throughout the year, this may add 
complexity to the permit definition. 
The fourth objective is that the social benefit of the 
program be robust, or insensitive, to errors in the data upon 
which its design and operation depend. In planning the permit 
program, there will necessarily be errors in measuring 
parameter values upon which the program design depend. To 
the extent possible, the program should be designed to 
minimize the dependence of its smooth functioning on the 
values of those parameters. 
The fifth objective is to maximize economic efficiency, 
i.e., the economic benefit of the water in use. This could 
conceivably be accomplished by clever allocation, but may be 
served at lower administrative cost simply by allowing 
voluntary permit transfers among users. 
The fmal objective is political and legal feasibility. 
Regardless of how well a permit system performs its 




The agency must first decide what the permit should 
entitle its holder to do under what circumstances. It is often 
convenient to think of it as entitling its holder to withdraw a 
certain volumetric flow rate (e.g., liters per minute) of water,  
but the complexity of stream systems may require a more 
detailed operational definition. Such a definition must be 
more complete and must say where water may be withdrawn 
and what happens when there is not enough water to supply 
all permits. Options are: 
No Regulations The absence of regulations means that water 
is most available to whoever takes it first, where "first" does 
not necessarily mean first in time, as under the western 
appropriative system. Indeed, "first" might mean just 
upstream of another user, and in a position to deprive him or 
her of all water. Hence, one sound argument for water 
regulations is the protection of current water users. 
Prioritized Permit Basis Under the prioritized basis a set of 
priorities is established whereby a user is allowed a certain 
fixed rate of water withdrawal as long as the TAW is enough 
to satisfy him or her and all other users with a higher priority. 
When it is not, users forego withdrawals according to their 
priorities. This basis is used under the appropriative doctrine 
in the western U.S., where such priorities have been set 
according to the date of first request for the water permit or 
first use of water by the user. It has proved functional there, 
but cannot be adapted to humid regions because of the 
difficulty of establishing these temporal priorities among 
users whose undocumented withdrawals may have existed for 
decades or well over a century. 
Fractional Permit Basis Under the fractional basis of 
definition, each user is allotted a constant, but generally 
different, percentage of the TAW. Thus, as the TAW 
fluctuates, so does the amount of water allotted to each user; 
no user is ever entirely deprived of water. Under this basis, 
no permit has priority over another, although they may differ 
in size. The fractional permit basis is often regarded as the 
only appropriate approach for humid regions because of the 
lack of data by which to establish historically-based priorities 
among users. There may, however, be some perceived equity 
and administrative disadvantages to this basis. First, there is 
no easy way to issue free permits to newcomers, although 
they may buy their way in and may be accommodated through 
staggered limited-duration permits (see below). By contrast, 
the prioritized permit basis may be structured to 
accommodate newcomers by assigning them lowest priority. 
The second disadvantage is that it is more difficult to account 
for the geometric complexity of real river systems under this 
type of permit definition basis. This problem, which is too 
complex to explore fully here, stems from the oft-perceived 
need for fractional permits, unlike prioritized permits, to refer 
to a particular stream gauge. Ways of addressing this 
problem also exist, but are too complex to discuss here. 
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Allocation Basis 
The agency must decide the basis for distributing the 
permits among the users, i.e., deciding the rate of allowable 
withdrawal or the fraction of the TAW the user is allowed to 
withdraw. In the past in appropriative states, allocations to 
users were based on user claims or the agency's judgment 
about the amount of water each user "needed." The potential 
for equity challenges to this approach in humid areas is 
obvious, especially as temporal priorities are difficult to 
establish. 
Allocations in humid areas could be roughly proportional 
to some measure of past use rate. Provisions could and 
should be incorporated to avoid rewarding those who had 
used water wastefully in the past, and certainly to dissuade 
users from profligate use in the present for the sole purpose 
of receiving a higher allocation in the future. This poses the 
problem of estimating past withdrawal rates that may have 
been unmeasured. 
Alternatively, the size of a fractional permit might be 
proportional to a measure of the size of an operation such as 
the length of riparian streamfront, the area of riparian 
irrigated land, or the population served by a municipal water 
supplier. 
Voluntary Permit Transfers 
Voluntary transfers (i.e., buying and selling) of water 
permits among users may be allowed within limited lengths 
of the stream. The most frequently-cited argument in favor of 
this feature is economic efficiency (see, e.g., Anderson, 1983 
a&b; Eheart and Lyon, 1983). Transfers also provide an 
incentive to develop and adopt ways of using water more 
efficiently, through recycling and waste reduction (Anderson, 
1983b). Transfers have received endorsements from many 
policy analysts (Johnson et al, 1981; Stavins, 1989). The 
additional administrative costs of transfers are expected to be 
modest; the agency must maintain a registry of permits and 
transfer restrictions must be decided upon and administered. 
No cost data need be collected, however, and no cost 
optimization need be done (at least, not by the agency). The 
agency may opt to set up a brokering operation, but transfers 
are generally voluntary and need not be brokered at all. 
The chief drawback of this policy is that, through an 
unfavorable set of transfers, concentrated withdrawals might 
occur, rendering it more difficult to maintain stream flow 
standards near such points of concentration. Additionally, 
under these circumstances, the neighbors of a permit buyer 
may be impaired and the neighbors of the seller may receive 
a windfall benefit (Eheart and Lyon, 1983). 
This problem may be addressed by limiting trading to 
users who have approximately the same effect on the 
streamflow. Alternatively, permits may be otherwise altered 
as they are transferred so as not to impact minimum flows or  
third parties. A third approach is to require compensation to 
third parties. 
Transfer restrictions may undermine efficiency gains and 
may not be effective in protecting third parties anyway. Third 
party compensation has been endorsed by some researchers 
(e.g., Coase, 1960). Others (e.g., Baumol and Oates, 1988) 
note potential problems of strategic behavior if third parties 
are given final authority on whether a transfer is allowed. 
Another potential drawback of transfers is that, because of the 
usually small number of participants, one or a few parties 
may be able to manipulate the permits market to their 
advantage. 
Duration of Permits and Accommodation of Newcomers. 
The agency faces a dilemma in deciding the length of time a 
permit is valid. As noted by Eheart and Lyon (1983), permits 
that are valid for only a short time may not allow the users 
sufficient time to pay off capital equipment and may thus 
result in economically inefficient decisions. (For example, the 
user may purchase less expensive equipment that uses water 
inefficiently.) A long permit validity will present difficulty in 
accommodating newcomers, and a risk of violating minimum 
flows. One way of addressing this dilemma is a system of 
staggered permits of n-year duration under which the agency 
may lower the total number of permits by as much as 1/n per 
year simply by not reissuing expired permits. 
Averaging Periods. It is not possible for water users to 
restrict their withdrawals to a certain flowrate at all times, 
nor is it always desirable from the agency's perspective for 
them to do so. Crops need only be irrigated when they 
undergo moisture deficit, and municipal demands fluctuate 
according to the weather and the incidence of fire. It is 
therefore appropriate for the agency to grant users some 
flexibility by restricting their time-averaged, rather than their 
instantaneous, withdrawals. The question then becomes one 
of choosing the averaging period. The larger the averaging 
period, the more flexibility the users have but the greater the 
opportunity exists for them to overexploit the water resource, 
if only temporarily. Averaging periods will range from days 
for unimpounded streams to years for aquifers. 
SUMMARY 
In choosing a system of rules for administering water 
withdrawals, the agency faces a bewildering array of 
decisions and tradeoffs. In regions where water using 
economic activities are well established, it is unlikely that 
anything but a system of sharing will be politically 
acceptable. Permit transfers are a feature that will probably 
find favor among users and the agency will be under some 
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pressure to undertake the administrative cost to implement 
them. Key to the operation of any such program is the 
existence of an adequate system of stream gauges and 
streamflow record keeping. 
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